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A Fresh Look at State Asset
Protection Trust Statutes
Ronald J. Mann*
This Article examines the rise of state asset protection trust ('APT)
statutes. It juxtaposes two apparently contrary trends: an increase in formal
legal responses suggesting that the trusts created under these statutes are likely
to have at best limited enforceability and an increase in the adoption and use of
these statutes. After summarizing the legal background out of which these two
trends arise, I analyze the characteristics of the states that have chosen to adopt
them to date and conclude that the size of a state is less predictive of adoption
than broader social and economic characteristics of the populace.
This Article closes with a discussion of why the use of the statutes is
growing. In general, the limited litigation, coupled with apparently increasing
enactments and usage, suggests the statutes are producing something useful
that investment professionals can sell.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recognizing my general lack of familiarity with trust law, the
organizers of the conference graciously invited me to talk about the
intersection of trust law and bankruptcy. To be specific, they offered the
topic of bankruptcy court treatment of the recent spate of state "asset
protection trust" statutes (often referred to as "APT" statutes). In
general, these statutes allow an individual (the "settlor" of the trust) to
shelter assets by transferring them to a trust that his creditors cannot
reach; if the settlor can continue to control the assets when they are in
the trust, 1 the arrangement trades a minor inconvenience for immunity
from liability.
I had heard a little about this subject years ago when Lynn
LoPucki first described the "Death of Liability."2 At that time, he
pointed to these statutes as a prominent harbinger of the soon-to-arrive
death of liability; the opportunity they offered the crafty to shield their
assets from creditors seemed almost too good to be true. I also had a
general sense that APT statutes had become much more common
through the years, but that was about the sum of my knowledge. When
the organizers told me of the burgeoning adoptions, and that cases
applying those statutes were just beginning to reach the bankruptcy
courts, I thought it would be interesting to engage in an analysis of APT
statutes.
This Article is the result of that inquiry. In general, the story
offers a fascinating juxtaposition of two apparently contrary trends:
formal legal responses suggesting with steadily increasing specificity
that the trusts created under the statutes are likely to have, at best,
limited enforceability, coupled with a continuing increase in adoption
and (so far as I can tell) use of the statutes. There seems to be little or
no link between the formal legal rules, which suggest that trusts
created under the statutes are unenforceable, and the institutions
adopting and using the statutes, which operate on the implicit premise
that trusts created under the statutes provide "real" legal protections.
This Article proceeds in three parts. First, I summarize the legal
background, starting with the long-standing use of offshore APTs; then
I discuss the development of "onshore" APTs in this country. I
emphasize the legal and practical obstacles that have made the use of
offshore APT statutes a relatively minor feature of American insolvency
planning.
1. That, of course, is a big "if." I elaborate on that question below.
2. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 1 (1996).
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Second, I discuss the adoption of the state statutes, examining
the factors that motivate a state's decision to adopt an APT statute
(what you might call the "supply" of and "demand" for debtor-protective
legislation). Although the steadily continuing adoptions suggest it is too
early to draw firm conclusions, the pattern of adoption suggests a more
complex explanation than the mere "size" of the state. Rather, I argue
that broader social and economic characteristics of the populace itself
seem to be relevant, at least among those states that already have
adopted the statutes.
Third, I discuss the response of the legal system to the state-
level APT adoptions. If the state-level enactments are motivated (as
opponents suggest) by the aspirations of particular states to become
havens for debtors seeking to avoid payments to creditors in other
states, we might naturally expect a federal legal response limiting that
kind of gamesmanship. Thus, it is no surprise to see federal legislation
(a targeted amendment to the Bankruptcy Code) and a growing body of
case law undermine the effectiveness of those statutes. In general, those
cases suggest that the statutes are likely to have little or no substantive
effect to protect assets from creditors.
At the same time, the limited litigation, coupled with apparently
increasing enactments and usage, suggests the statutes are producing
something useful that investment professionals can sell. I conclude with
some brief speculations about the possibility of a new equilibrium
developing that accommodates both the formal legal invalidity and the
burgeoning actual use of the trusts.
II. LEGISLATING THE DEATH OF LIABILITY?
What makes the APT interesting to me is its value in illustrating
the dynamic responses of a legal system to a new external stimulus-in
this case, the impulse to ease the ability of the wealthy to insulate
themselves from liability. Without expressing an opinion on the
propriety of adopting the statutes, 3 it is enough for my purposes to
acknowledge a felt need for limiting the statutes' scope. As one early
writer comments, "[a]n orderly system of liability is too important to
society to allow vast amounts of wealth to be placed out of the reach of
3. I have little interest in expressing a normative view about the desirability of those
statutes. Suffice it to say that most (though not all) academics consider the subject find them
offensive. Compare, e.g., Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protection Trusts: Having Your Cake
and Eating It Too, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 56-80 (1994) (articulating traditional opposition to
asset protection trusts), with Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2685, 2686 (2006) (making the case for asset protection trusts).
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creditors."4 The question for investigation in this Article is what societal
institutions have done (or not done) to keep the APT in check.
As background, it is useful to begin with a discussion of the
"original" legal framework, from which I can trace the formal
developments that, over time, have endeavored to loosen the
constraints on the wealthy.
A. The Baseline
The traditional rule, in this country at least, has been that an
asset-protection (or self-settled) trust is not effective to transfer assets
out of the reach of creditors. In order to understand that rule, consider
Debtor, who hopes to protect himself from Creditor. To do that, Debtor
creates a trust for Debtor's own benefit and transfers all of Debtor's
savings to a trust for which Debtor is the sole beneficiary. So long as
the trust is irrevocable,5 the transfer of the assets to the trust should
mean that Debtor (as settlor) no longer owns them, and thus Creditor
cannot reach those assets by pointing to Debtor's status as settlor. To
prevent Creditor from reaching Debtor's interest as beneficiary, Debtor
(as settlor) provides in the trust instrument that Debtor's interest as
the beneficiary of the trust will not be subject to the claims of Creditor.
The legal status of provisions that limit the ability of creditors
to reach trust assets is not controversial. First, creditors ordinarily
cannot reach the interest of a beneficiary in a trust that contains such
a limitation (a so-called "spendthrift" trust).6 Thus, if a wealthy father
conveys assets into a trust for his minor children and provides that
creditors cannot reach those funds, the funds will remain protected
from creditors. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts makes an exception,
however, for our situation: "[a] restraint on the voluntary and
involuntary alienation of a beneficial interest retained by the settlor of
a trust is invalid."7 It is one thing, then, to convey assets to a family
member but quite another to convey them to oneself; trust law
understandably respects the common legitimate reasons for the first
transaction but disregards the artifice of the second.
The comments to the Restatement (Third) make it plain that the
purpose of the rule invalidating self-settled spendthrift trusts is to
4. Eric Henzy, Offshore and Other Shore Asset Protection Trusts, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 739, 743 (1999).
5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25, cmt. e (2003) (explaining the consequences of a
revocable trust).
6. Id. § 58(1).
7. Id. § 58(2).
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protect creditors. Among other applications, the comments construe the
rule broadly to cover a range of scenarios that might otherwise seem
debatable. The most obvious is that the rule is absolute: creditors
seeking to pierce through to the trust's assets need not prove any intent
on the part of the settlor to "hinder, delay, or defraud." 8 That is, the rule
"does not depend on the settlor having made a transfer in fraud of
creditors."9
There is nothing new about this. Similar rules appeared in the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts (published in 1959)10 and in the classic
treatment of the subject by Erwin Griswold;11 the prohibition on self-
settled spendthrift trusts is a typical feature of relevant state
statutes. 12
B. The Offshore Asset Protection Trust
In stark contrast to the unyielding clarity of American law on
the subject, foreign jurisdictions for many years have maintained legal
systems that enforce trust limitations preventing creditors from
reaching assets placed in self-settled trusts. 13 Specifically, a few small
jurisdictions, such as the Cook Islands or the Caymans, have recognized
the enforceability of such trusts for decades.14 In the earlier years,
perhaps, the purpose of the trusts, at least in part, was to limit tax
liability for settlors in the United Kingdom, which explains why most
popular jurisdictions for offshore APTs are members of the
Commonwealth.15 But by the 1980s they began to be used with
increasing frequency by wealthy U.S. nationals as a tool to protect
themselves against liability to their American creditors. 16
8. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1) (1984).
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. e.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(1) (1959).
11. ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS §§ 474-475 (2d ed. 1947).
12. E.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(2) (2000).
13. See Marty-Nelson, supra note 3, at 62 (explaining that certain countries are popular with
U.S. settlors due to this protection).
14. By the nature of the problem, it is difficult to identify all of the relevant jurisdictions.
LoPucki offers the following list gleaned from a variety of sources: Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda,
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Jersey,
Liechtenstein, Malta, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 33 n. 143.
15. See Antony G.D. Duckworth, The Offshore Trust, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 879, 881-
83, 930-32 (1999) (noting that tax was a major influence in the birth of these centers and many of
the offshore centers had rules inherited from England).
16. See id. at 930 (noting the emerging interest of American businessmen in the early 1980s).
2014] 1745
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
LoPucki provides a detailed discussion of offshore APTs in The
Death of Liability, emphasizing their long-term potential as a device for
vitiating the enforceability of judgments against the forethoughtful.17
But several features of offshore APTs have limited their potential to
effect a mainstream incursion upon the enforceability of judgments. The
most obvious feature is that offshore APTs are relatively expensive,
necessarily involving overseas professionals and, typically, some
overseas travel. Still, as the costs have come down, offshore APTs have
become more accessible to individuals of less-than-fabulous wealth; for
example, one expert estimated that by 2000 the costs had fallen to less
than $20,000 to set up a trust, which, together with annual fees of
several thousand dollars, is "a relatively small price to pay to put assets
out of the reach of creditors."1 8
The difficulties that arise from the transfer of assets to a trust
impose a more practical limitation. The more "real" (and thus legally
reliable) the transfer is, the less practical control the settlor will have
over the assets, and the harder it will be for the settlor to retrieve them
in case of voluntary need. As Jim White puts it, "Any time a potential
debtor puts its assets beyond the reach of creditors with the expectation
of continuing to enjoy them or of later getting them back, there is the
persistent threat that the transferee will prove unfaithful or
incapable."19
More importantly, it rapidly became clear that because the
offshore APTs would not be respected in this country, their value for
protecting assets was limited to assets that effectively could be moved
offshore. The basic problem is that American courts, when considering
trusts formed by American individuals for the apparent purpose of
protecting assets from American creditors, typically applied the law of
the jurisdiction with the "most significant interest"2 0 in the matter-
the jurisdiction of the settlor's residence.
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
took that view early on in the widely cited Portnoy decision. 21 Similar
17. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 32-38.
18. Henzy, supra note 4, at 740. Whatever one might think about the judgment that those
costs are small, they plainly would put this device out of the useful reach of middle-class businesses
and professionals.
19. James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's The Death
of Liability Essay, 107 YALE L.J. 1363, 1409 (1998).
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270 (1971) (articulating that
standard).
21. Marine Midland Bank v. Portnoy (In re Portnoy), 201 B.R. 685, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1996).
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decisions from bankruptcy courts in Connecticut 22 and Florida 23 seemed
to have settled the application of American trust principles to offshore
APTs. Importantly, as mentioned above, mainstream American law
invalidated these trusts without regard to the circumstances of their
creation (that is, without proof of fraud). Thus, the decision to apply
American law effectively invalidated the offshore APT, at least from the
perspective of American courts. In sum, these trusts protected assets
that could be placed in the foreign (haven) jurisdiction, but American
courts did not enforce them to protect assets subject to domestic
jurisdiction. 24
C. The Domestic Asset Protection Trust
There matters stood until 1997, shortly (coincidentally?) after
the publication of The Death of Liability,25 when Alaska adopted the
first domestic APT statute. 26 Noting the prompt action by Delaware to
follow Alaska's lead, 27 LoPucki predicted that these laws would "mark
a historic change in the policy of American jurisdictions toward
judgment proofing."28 As was immediately obvious, these statutes were
likely to make the practice of asset protection much easier, both because
they would be cheaper to arrange and because of the greater ease (and
comfort level) of transactions wholly situated in this country.29
Worried that American states would seek to become havens like
the Cook Islands or the Caymans, scholars quickly proclaimed concerns
that a "race to the bottom" would force the quick spread of such
legislation. The most articulate advocate of that view was Stewart
Sterk, who responded to the "visible and tangible" competition between
22. Sattin v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 217 B.R. 98, 101-02 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1998).
23. Goldberg v. Lawrence (In re Lawrence), 227 B.R. 907, 917-18 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998).
24. E.g., Henzy, supra note 4, at 753-60. For a contrary view, which seems quite strained to
this writer, see Gideon Rothschild et al., Self-Settled Spendthrift Trusts: Should a Few Bad Apples
Spoil the Bunch?, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 763, 767-78 (1999) (arguing that the results in
Portnoy and Brooks are inconsistent with normal conflicts principles but rest instead on the "bad
facts" of those particular cases).
25. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413, 1415
(1998) (noting the juxtaposition).
26. Alaska Trust Act, 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 6, § 8 (codified at ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110
(2013)).
27. Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act, 71 Del. Laws, ch. 159 (1997) (codified at DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-3576 (2014)). The Delaware legislature explained that the purpose of the
statute was "to maintain Delaware's role as the most favored domestic jurisdiction for the
establishment of trusts." H.R. 356, 139th Leg., 1st Sess. (Del. 1997) (LEXIS) (synopsis).
28. LoPucki, supra note 25, at 1415.
29. See Henzy, supra note 4, at 740-41 (making that point).
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the states with a careful analysis of "imperfections in the competitive
process . . . that undermine the claim that interstate competition will
generate efficient trust law rules."30
Sterk worked directly in the tradition of Cary's work on the race
to the bottom in Delaware. 31 He emphasized the likelihood that a
"systematic bias may ... lea[d] state governments to [excessive] ...
incentive[s] to attract new businesses." 32 He starts from the premise
that trusts (like corporations) readily can be moved from state to state. 33
Then, if a state assumes that three-quarters of the trusts taking
advantage of the state's regime are from other states, it would benefit
from adopting an APT statute, even if it thought that the net effect of
the statute would be negative. 34
Sterk posited a two-stage model of the long-term effects of
interstate competition for trust law.35 The underlying assumption of his
model reasons that the adverse costs of the statutes would be the losses
to creditors and the related diminution of investment. 36 Conversely, the
benefits would flow from the increase in local financial assets. 37 The
first stage considers small trust-importing states, where the balance
would tip toward adoption; most of the losses would be borne by citizens
of other states, and the benefits of increased local financial assets would
be felt locally.38 Less charitably, it is easy to characterize that activity
30. Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law's Race to the Bottom, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1035, 1039 (2000).
31. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663, 705 (1974) (arguing for federal regulation of corporate conduct to prevent "the absurdity
of this race for the bottom."). Cary's work has been examined and clarified by so many scholars in
the four decades since he first wrote that any effort to summarize the scholarly reaction is fruitless.
To get a flavor for the developments from a few of the most important contributions qualifying
Cary's thesis, see Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977) (arguing against Cary's proposed
"interventionist rules" because they ignore the cost side of the analysis); Roberta Romano, Law as
a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 225, 265-73 (1985) (finding
that reincorporation in Delaware is not a negative present value event and sometimes produces
'positive abnormal returns" for shareholders).
32. Sterk, supra note 30, at 1058.
33. Id. at 1065-66.
34. Id. at 1065-68.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. That certainly includes increased business for the local estate planning bar and
commercial trustee community. See John K. Eason, Policy, Logic, and Persuasion in the Evolving
Realm of Trust Asset Protection, 27 CARDOzO L. REV. 2621, 2656-57 (2006) (noting a desire to
attract local business as a reason why states adopt APT legislation).
38. See Sterk, supra note 30, at 1066-69 (explaining why smaller states have taken the lead
in developing APT statutes).
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as "preying on" neighboring states by "exporting" adverse legal effects. 39
Still, it is just as easy to construct a contrary, quasi-heroic perspective,
in which the statutes are a populist reaction to the outrages of the
broken American liability system-dominated by insane juries that
hand out appalling verdicts for punitive damages, which leads to
malpractice premia that make it all but impossible for doctors and
lawyers to provide the services our communities so sorely need. Suffice
it to say that it will be difficult to collect data assessing the sincerity of
either perspective or the extent to which it motivated support for any
particular statute.
Of course, the harms to creditors can be overstated. Adam
Hirsch, for example, has emphasized that the trusts may do relatively
little harm to subsequent creditors because the settlors' divestitures of
assets are relatively clear. 40 Thus, he contends, the main potential
harm is to preexisting creditors, against whom the conveyance is likely
to be voidable as a fraudulent conveyance.4 1 That is, of course, little
solace to involuntary creditors, a problem that Hirsch acknowledges. 42
The second stage of Sterk's model considers the incentives of
larger states in which a much larger share of the trust creditors would
be local. If his relatively simple conception of the costs and benefits were
correct, then the balance, at least initially, would tip decidedly against
adoption by large states like California. 43 Still, Sterk reasoned, if
capital were perfectly mobile, so that a disparity in asset protection
would drive substantially all California-originated trust business to
Alaska, in the end even California (and other large states) would be
driven to adopt APT statutes.44
III. THE RACE IS ON, OR IS IT?
My role, fifteen years later, is to assess this race. Did it happen?
Was it a race to the bottom? Has it affected the legal system in any
substantial way? More importantly for this Article, what can the
39. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 51 (2005).
40. Hirsch, supra note 3, at 2688-89.
41. Id. at 2688-92.
42. Id. at 2695-97.
43. See Sterk, supra note 30, at 1069-70 (arguing that smaller states are in a better position
initially to export the costs of APTs). The analysis of Eason, supra note 37, at 2654-61, is quite
similar to that of Sterk, except that Eason (writing with the benefit of hindsight) can observe that
the trend in adoption had not yet shifted to Sterk's second stage (adoption by large states).
44. See Sterk, supra note 30, at 1070-72 (explaining this hypothesis through the use of game
theory).
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pattern of adoption tell us about the motivations that promote (and
retard) the adoption of APT statutes? In general, I extend Sterk's
analysis in two directions. After summarizing the bare facts of
adoptions, I first explore the characteristics of the states that have
adopted the statutes. Although the data points are few, the evidence
suggests that broader attributes of the nature of the state's economy
are at least as relevant, if not more relevant, than the size of the state
alone. Second, I provide some tentative evidence to support Sterk's
prediction that the statutes will come over time to larger and larger
states.
My analysis begins with the bare facts regarding the
dissemination of APT statutes. In one sense, the prophets of adoption
were not wholly disappointed. Although adoptions were slow during the
early 1990s, they have continued sporadically, with the most recent
adoptions by Idaho and Utah in 2013.45 In all, a dozen states have
followed the lead of Alaska and Delaware, so that fourteen states now
have APT legislation. 46
Of course, fourteen states is hardly a consensus. The more
relevant question for our purposes is what the adoptions can tell us
about the accuracy of the various public-choice theories articulated a
decade or more ago at the advent of onshore APT statutes. Even before
the advent of the onshore statutes, commentators assumed that
"nations compete for foreign investment by refusing comity with respect
to the enforcement of judgments and providing havens for judgment
debtors from their foreign creditors."4 7 This suggests that it is useful to
identify the factors that might have led American states to participate
in such a race to the (intended) disadvantage of their sister states.4 8
45. See infra n.46 (which provides details of all of the adoptions).
46. The other states, in order of enactment, are Rhode Island and Nevada (1999), Missouri
and Oklahoma (2004), South Dakota (2005), Tennessee and Wyoming (2007), New Hampshire
(2009), Hawaii (2010), Virginia (2012), and finally Ohio and Utah (2013). The Appendix provides
detailed citations to all of those statutes. I omit Colorado from the list, because the nineteenth-
century statute on which APT advocates rely is both less clearly effective than the modern
legislation and plainly unrelated to any interstate competition. See Eason, supra note 37, at 2661
n. 197 (summarizing the Colorado situation); Joseph G. Hodges, II & Eugene P. Zuspann, II, Can
Some Colorado Trusts Provide Protection from Claims of Creditors?, 28 COLO. LAW. 61, 61-63
(1999) (providing a detailed discussion).
47. LoPucki, supra note 2, at 32-33.
48. The analysis is complicated by the likelihood that states might adopt APT statutes for
reasons not closely tied to the avoidance of liability. It is clear, for example, that one common use
of asset-protection trusts is to make more fully effective the division of property in a marital pre-
nuptial agreement. See Duncan E. Osborne, Asset Protection Planning to Avoid Marital Claims,
AM. COLL. OF TR. AND EST. COUNS. (Summer 2007 Meeting, Salt Lake City, Utah) (on file with
author). Another common use of the trust is to exclude assets from the gross taxable estate of the
1750 [Vol. 67:6:1741
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As suggested above, the first question to examine is whether the
most useful way to understand the pattern of adoption is to look at size.
To start with the simplest problem, it is not at all obvious what the best
measure of size would be. If we are looking at acreage, Alaska and
Nevada (pro-APT states) are quite large. Similarly, if we are looking at
population, Ohio and Virginia (recent APT adopters) are both well
above the median.
Moving beyond anecdotal impressions, Figure 1 illustrates that
the States that have adopted APT statutes are somewhat smaller in
population than states without such statutes and somewhat larger in
area. To be sure, simple pairwise correlation tests indicate that the
relations between population and area, on the one hand, and APT
adoption, on the other, are weak at best.49 For present purposes,
though, I use population as the most useful indicator of size.
settlor at death. E.g., Charles D. Fox IV et al., Perpetual Trusts and Creditor Protection: Looking
at New Possibilities, at G-18 to G-27 (1998, unpublished CLE presentation) (on file with author).
49. Neither is significant at the 5% level.
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Based on the intuition that something other than raw size might
be important, I integrated data from the Census Bureau on a variety of
state-level social and economic indicators with the database of APT
adoptions. In contrast to the data related to size, several of the social
and economic variables do relate significantly to APT adoption. For
illustrative purposes, Figure 2 displays the four variables that have
significant relations to the fact of adoption.50 The share of Hispanics in
the population and the percentage of the population born in the United
States are closely related variables. The pairwise correlations, at least,
suggest that APT statutes are more likely to appear in states that have
a lower percentage of Hispanics and a higher percentage of U.S. natives
in the population. The bottom panels relate to economic activity. On
those points, APT statutes appear to be more likely in states with less
disparity in income distributions and less likely in states with a greater
number of banks. 51
Although the number of observations is slight (51), the
correlations are suggestive as a group. For example, the correlations
50. Each of the variables in Figure 2 relates significantly to APT adoption at the 5% level.
51. To be clear, all of the comparisons discussed in this paragraph are weighted by the
populations of the individual states.
1752 [Vol. 67:6:1741
ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS
tend to indicate that socioeconomic diversity in the population dampens
the demand for the statutes. That might be true, for example, if
socioeconomic diversity relates to the existence of important interests
that would support and oppose APT statutes, preventing a sufficient
consensus to motivate adoption. Conversely, the presence of banks
might correlate with hostility to debtor-protective legislation, as banks
would lobby their legislators to oppose such statutes.
These bivariate correlations, however interesting, raise the
immediate question of whether any of these relations would be
significant in a multivariate model. The results of a multivariate
model 52 assessing the likelihood a particular state has an APT at the
present time suggests that the measure of income inequality is
significant at the ten percent level and that none of the other variables
is significant even at the ten percent level. 53 Given the correlations
among the various explanatory variables and the small number of
observations, it is not surprising that the results are only marginally
significant. It is intriguing, though, that the effects of income inequality
appear to be more important than the effects of any other indicator.
To illustrate the combined relations among income inequality,
population, and APT adoption, Figure 3 provides a scatterplot of income
inequality against population, with the APT states marked in blue and
the non-APT states marked in red.54 Several things about that figure
are interesting. The first is the strength of the positive correlation
between income inequality and total population;55 as the green line
indicates, the data roughly mark out a swath that rises from left to right
with increasing population. Second, adopting jurisdictions (indicated in
blue) cluster in the bottom left quadrant of the population; most of the
adopting states are below the mean (indicated as zero in Figure 3) on
both population and inequality of income distribution. This suggests
that the statutes are most commonly adopted in the states that are both
relatively small and relatively balanced in the distribution of income.
52. Results are available upon request.
53. I also explored political orientation, based on using the percentage of individuals voting
Republican in the last Presidential election. The results suggested no substantial relation with
APT adoption. This makes sense, given the conflicting policy effects of the statutes-helping the
wealthy (which Republicans commonly support), but assisting the bankrupt in avoiding payment
of debts (which Republicans commonly oppose).
54. To put the variables on the same scale, each variable is standardized. The figure displays
the number of standard deviations that any given state is above, or below, the mean value for Gini
inequality or population, as the case may be. Thus, the mean on both variables, as represented in
the scatterplot, is zero.
55. Pairwise correlations indicate that the relation is significant at the 5% level.
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None of the adopting states are near the top of the distribution in either
population or income inequality.
The next question of interest is whether the data suggest a trend
in adoption. Specifically, what do the data suggest about Sterk's
prediction that over time the larger states would start to adopt the
statutes? Figure 4 presents the limited data available on that point,
comparing the income inequality and population of the adopting states
to the progressing years of adoption. Here, the data (admittedly sparse)
provide considerable support for Sterk's hypothesis, suggesting that
population in fact is important, as the population of states at the time
they adopt APT statutes was larger in recent years than past years.
1754 [Vol. 67:6:1741
ASSET PROTECTION TRUSTS
To close, the evidence of Figure 4 provides yet another
qualification to the analysis summarized above. If the types of states
that are adopting APT statutes are continuing to change, then there is
every reason to think that the characteristics associated with adoption
are changing as well. Still, even that tentative discussion does suggest
that the conditions that support adoption are far more intricate, and
socially grounded, than a simple correlation with size of the state's
population.
IV. LAW ON THE GROUND: LIABILITY IN THE APT WORLD
Next, this Article considers how the legal system has responded
to state APT adoptions. As suggested above, the natural response in a
federal system to state legislation premised on externalizing costs to
other states would be a federal-level prohibition; conceptually, the out-
of-state effects of APT statutes are no different from downwind air
pollution.56 So it should be no surprise that federal legislators promptly
responded to the earliest spate of APT adoptions with a specific
56. See, e.g., EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1593 (2014)
(discussing externalities of air pollution).
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provision targeting the use of APTs, the so-called Talent Amendment to
the Bankruptcy Code.5 7 Adopted in 2005 as Section 1402 of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
("BAPCPA") 58 and codified as Bankruptcy Code § 548(e),5 9 that
provision directly extends the statute of limitations to ten years for any
"transfer ... made to a self-settled trust or similar device."60
Lest there be any doubt about the motivation for the enactment,
the House Report explains it as a response designed to close the "self-
settled trust loophole."61 Representative Delahunt captured the
perspective of those supporting the provision when he commented:
"This loophole [i.e., the tolerance for state APT laws] is, in my judgment,
evidence of how the current bankruptcy system provides two
bankruptcy laws, one for the well connected and one for middle class
families." 62 The parallelism between the quick federal response and the
analysis of the preceding section bears noting: if diversity of interest
within all but the most homogenous of the individual states prevents
enactment of legislation supporting APTs, it should be no surprise that
support for those statutes is ineffective at the federal level.
Of course, there is no a priori reason to suppose that federal
legislation will be any more effective in its intended purpose than state
legislation. The most important inquiry would examine what the effects
of the dueling pro- and anti-APT statutes have been on the ground.
With adoptions by Ohio, Utah, and Virginia in the last two years, there
is little reason to think that the process of adoption has ended.
Specifically, what have the proponents of state-level APT adoptions
gotten for all of their efforts (and, presumably, substantial campaign
contributions)? 63 My sense, admittedly based on the earliest returns of
57. This Talent Amendment is to be distinguished from the Talent-Nelson Amendment,
Section 670 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.
No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (codified at 1049 U.S.C. § 987) (prohibiting high-interest loans
to military personnel and their dependents).
58. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat.
23, 214-15 (2005).
59. For ease of explication, subsequent references to provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are
by section number only. All citations refer to the Bankruptcy Code as presently in force in Title 11
of the United States Code.
60. Section 548(e)(1)(A).
61. H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 449 (2005) (comment of Rep.
Cannon).
62. Id. at 448 (comment of Rep. Delahunt).
63. The discussion here is in the same vein as the discussion in Mann, Bankruptcy Reform
and the "Sweat Box" of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 375, 397 (concluding that unintended
consequences limited the benefits from the adoption of BAPCPA expected by the proponents who
had sought bankruptcy reform for the benefit of credit-card lenders).
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less than a handful of cases, is that the proponents have to this date
gotten very little, and certainly nothing worth any substantial
investment in the legislation. To make that point, it is useful to consider
separately the differing situations of same-state settlors (seeking to use
an APT statute adopted by their principal state of activity) and out-of-
state settlors (seeking to take advantage of an APT statute adopted by
another state).
A. Same-State Settlors
Two points are important here. First, from the point of view of
federal public policy, there is quite a bit less to complain about
regarding the application of an APT statute to the affairs of a person
primarily operating in the state. If the Texas legislature adopts a
statute easing the ability of Texas debtors to escape the collection
efforts of Texas creditors, it seems at least reasonably likely that the
most substantial harms (or benefits) of that statute will accrue to the
constituents of the adopting legislators.64 Although the increasing
integration of the national and global economies suggests that effects
will never be borne entirely in the principal jurisdictions, the likely
externalization of harms is at its lowest in that situation.
More broadly, concerns about the deteriorative effect of "haven"
jurisdictions have no purchase on those kinds of in-state transactions.
As summarized above, the outraged complaints about the offshore
jurisdictions adopting APT statutes focus exclusively on the scenario in
which American debtors are using offshore statutes to escape the
collection efforts of American creditors, based on payment of fees to
professionals in the offshore jurisdiction. Who would complain if the
owner of a Cayman Islands business used the Cayman APT statute to
escape Cayman creditors?
Given that perspective-that this is the best-case scenario for
enforcement of an APT-it is surprising that the limited litigation to
date suggests that even same-state settlors gain relatively little from
the use of APTs. The leading case here (admittedly perhaps the only
64. That is not to say that Texas middle-class workers, for whom asset protection is
unavailable, would feel themselves fairly treated by a system that permits the ready evasion of
liability but limits the instrument of evasion to the wealthy. It is simply to say that their interests
are more fairly represented in a system in which both the creditors and debtors are in the same
jurisdiction than they are in a system in which the creditors and debtors are, for the most part, in
distinct jurisdictions. The obvious example would be creditors in California (which has no APT
statute) unable to enforce debts against debtors in Nevada (which does have an APT statute).
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relevant example) is Battley v. Mortensen.65 Mortensen, the debtor in
that case, was a chronically unemployed geologist whose principal asset
was an acre of unimproved property near Seldovia, Alaska.66 Mortensen
received clear title to the asset in connection with a 1998 divorce from
the spouse with whom he originally had purchased the property. In
2005, he transferred the property to a self-settled trust as permitted by
Alaska law.67
Thereafter, Mortensen's financial affairs steadily deteriorated,
the product of sporadic income and the use of speculative investments
in an effort to obtain funds to pay living expenses. Not surprisingly, the
records of his financial affairs are confused. It is plain, however, that
his credit card debts "ballooned" in the years after the trust was created;
his outstanding credit card debt at the time the trust was created
appears commensurate with his liquidity at that time. 68 When he
sought relief from an Alaska bankruptcy court in 2009, he listed about
$26,000 in personal property, against more than $250,000 in credit card
debt. He did not list his interest in the trust as property of the estate.69
In many ways, Mortensen is the most palatable case for
respecting the transfer of assets into an APT. His connection to Alaska
is undoubtedly genuine; the dispute involves Alaska real estate, to
which the application of Alaskan law can hardly be controversial.
Similarly, the record includes no substantial evidence that the
conveyance was designed to defraud an existing creditor. Moreover, he
is by no means the paradigmatic high-income individual seeking to
shelter a luxurious lifestyle from importunate creditors; his income in
the preceding five years ranged from a low of about $3,000 to a high of
about $33,000.70 By all accounts, Mr. Mortensen's decision to place the
assets in a trust was as benign an example of "insolvency planning" as
a lawyer can expect to observe.
Still, it was understandable given the assets at stake that the
trustee in bankruptcy tested the validity of the trust. Given the gap of
more than four years between the conveyance to the trust and the
bankruptcy filing, the trustee sought to invalidate the transfer as a
fraudulent conveyance under the ten-year statute of limitations of the
65. Battley v. Mortensen (In re Mortensen), 10 Alaska Bankr. Rep. 146 (Bankr. D. Alaska
2011).
66. Seldovia is a small town on the Kenai Peninsula, south of Anchorage.
67. Mortensen, 10 Alaska Bankr. Rep. at 147, 150.
68. Id. at 152. Mortensen owed about $15,000 to AT&T, $6,000 to Capitol One, and $12,000
to Discover. Id. at 159-60.
69. Id. at 153.
70. Id. at 148-49.
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Talent Amendment (§ 548(e)). The problem for the trustee, however,
was that the statute requires more than constructive intent; it requires
"actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" a creditor.71 The trustee's
argument faced an uphill battle: Mortensen testified that he simply
wanted to preserve the property for his children, and the absence of any
apparent contemporaneous creditors provided support for that
argument. To be sure, the trust document did state that the purpose of
the trust was "to maximize the protection of the trust estate ... from
creditors' claims of the Grantor [Mortensen]," but Alaskan law provides
that "a settlor's expressed intention to protect trust assets
from . . . potential future creditors is not evidence of an intent to
defraud."72
That language would seem to foreclose a challenge in a case like
Mortensen's under Alaskan state law, but the question in Mortensen
was how far the federal court in Alaska would go to accommodate the
views of the Alaska legislature. And the answer, plainly, is not so far.
Referring to the legislative history quoted above denigrating Alaska's
"self-settled trust loophole," 73 the court concluded that it "would be a
very odd result for a court interpreting a federal statute aimed at
closing a loophole to apply the state law that permits it." 7 Emphasizing
that § 548(e) explicitly refers to future creditors,75 the court concluded
the very act of placing assets in a self-settled trust provides the
necessary evidence of intent to defraud.76
To be sure, the opinion could be read more generously. The court
also emphasized Mortensen's solvency at the time the trust was
created.77 The court offered a discussion of Mortensen's financial
position in order to show that the existing credit card debts at the time
he created the trust provided an independent basis for finding the
requisite intent.78 But how often will a client of Mortensen's general
level of wealth come seeking the protection of an APT with no
cognizable credit card debt on his balance sheet? If this record
71. Section 548(e)(1)(D). The language is identical in relevant respects to the long-unchanged
phrasing of §548(a)(1)(A), which includes a two-year statute of limitations.
72. ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(b)(1) (2013).
73. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (describing Congress's intention to close the
loophole).
74. Mortensen, 10 Alaska Bankr. Rep. at 158.
75. Section 548(e)(1)(D) protects "any entity to which the debtor was, or became, on or after
the date that [the] transfer was made, indebted."
76. Mortensen, 10 Alaska Bankr. Rep. at 158.
77. Id. at 156.
78. Id. at 159-60.
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demonstrates intent to defraud, the quest for enforcement of an APT
will be like the proverbial camel seeking to pass through the needle's
eye.
In sum, if Mortensen stands for anything, it is the court's "bottom
line" assessment that Mortensen's use of an APT was "a clever but
fundamentally flawed scheme to avoid exposure to his creditors."79
Importantly, because that decision came from the only bankruptcy
jurisdiction in Alaska, the likelihood of successful reliance on that
statute seems all but remote.
B. Out-of-State Settlors
The situation for out-of-state settlors is quite different. First,
from the same public policy perspective that could tolerate application
of an APT statute to a resident, application of the statute to an out-of-
state settlor is much more troublesome. The situation described in the
Sterk model, in which the benefits of the statute accrue to the adopting
state but the costs burden the state in which creditors are located,
presents precisely the externalization of harm that consistently has
troubled opponents of APT statutes. It is therefore precisely the problem
that Alaska and Delaware (and more recently Ohio8o) are at least trying
to become havens attractive to the most foresightful of debtors.
Here, however, the judicial response has been even harsher than
in Mortensen.81 Relevant here are Green v. Zukerkorn82 and Waldron v.
Huber.83 Zukerkorn, the earlier of the two, is easily disposed of.
Zukerkorn involved a California bankruptcy of a debtor who was the
beneficiary of a Hawaii-governed spendthrift trust created by his
mother. Because California law was slightly more hostile to spendthrift
trusts than Hawaii law,84 the trustee in the son's bankruptcy sought to
79. Id. at 161.
80. See Scott Martin, Nevada Trust Big Says Ohio Takes Place of Delaware as Top Trust
Choice, THE TR. ADVISOR (Apr. 28, 2013), available at http://thetrustadvisor.com/tag/best-asset-
protection-states, archived at http://perma.cc/Z7AL-PQLZ (suggesting that Ohio's new statute
responded to legislators "watch[ing] their residents' wealth flow across the country" and that it
has left Delaware "vulnerable to billions of dollars in out-of-state assets slipping away").
81. This should come as no surprise. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the analysis
of the opinions summarized below in the text tracks the predictions of Henzy, supra note 4, at 747-
55.
82. Green v. Zukerkorn (In re Zukerkorn), 484 B.R. 182 (B.AP. 9th Cir. 2012).
83. Waldron v. Huber (In re Huber), 493 B.R. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2013).
84. California law would have permitted an order taking 25% of the income from the trust
for the benefit of creditors, while Hawaii law would have enforced the spendthrift provision in
accordance with its terms. In re Zukerkorn, 484 B.R. at 188-89.
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collect funds from the trust for the benefit of the son's creditors. Largely
because the settlor had lived in Hawaii when she created the trust, the
court declined to invalidate the trust's provisions. In passing, however,
explaining why the Hawaii statute was not so offensive to California
public policy as to justify invalidation, the appellate panel offered a
disparaging comparison to self-settled trusts:
The Trustee has not identified any recognized standard of morality in California that is
impacted by the application of Hawaii law [or explained] how upholding . .. an otherwise
valid spendthrift trust adversely affects the general interests of Californians. Although
self-settled trusts are void and against public policy in California . . . the . . . Zukerkorn
Trust is not a self-settled trust. 85
The court could hardly offer a plainer hint of the outcome of a case
involving a Hawaiian APT.
Waldron v. Huber addresses the central question: how will a
court in one state treat an APT formed under the law of another state?
The answer is plain-not well. Huber was a real estate developer who
had worked in the Puget Sound area for more than forty years. By 2007,
his affairs had begun to unravel. The court noted four suits filed against
him, each seeking to enforce a commercial promissory note (each in an
amount exceeding a half-million dollars). At this point, Huber set up an
Alaskan APT, to which he transferred the shares representing
controlling ownership of the bulk of his operating businesses. 86
The court's response was to offer a series of parallel reasons why
the protections of the trust should not avail. In general, the opinion
reads as if the court's pronounced distaste for APTs motivated it to
insulate its decision from appellate review by providing so many
justifications that at least one would be sure to withstand appellate
scrutiny.
The first and most obvious question was whether the protections
of the trust should be invalidated as offensive to the law of Washington:
if the court applied Washington law to evaluate the trust rather than
Alaska law, the trust's protections for Huber would vanish. Going
straight to the Restatement provisions summarized above, the court
explained that the trust would fail if Alaska had no significant relation
85. Id. at 193 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). The Court
quoted a California case explaining:
It is against public policy to permit a man to tie up his property in such a way that he
can enjoy it but prevent his creditors from reaching it, and where the settlor makes
himself a beneficiary of a trust any restraints in the instrument on the involuntary
alienation of his interest are invalid and ineffective.
Id. at 193 n.14 (citation omitted).
86. The discussion in this paragraph summarizes in re Huber, 493 B.R. at 802-06.
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to the trust.8 7 Here, the settlor and beneficiaries resided in Washington,
the assets (to the extent they had a location) were located in
Washington, the affected creditors were located in Washington, and the
attorney that prepared the documents for the trust was located in
Washington.88 On that record, the court could only conclude that
Alaska's relation to the trust was "minimal," while Washington's was
"substantial."8 9
Although that conclusion seemed hard to dispute, the court went
on to explain that it also would have invalidated the trust as offensive
to the public policy of Washington. Relying on Portnoy's90 invalidation
of an offshore APT and applying comment b to § 270 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts, the court summarily concluded that the trust was
so offensive to Washington policy as to warrant invalidation. 91
As a third reason for invalidation, the court turned to § 548(e),
the statute at issue in Mortensen.92 For reasons that the discussion
above makes clear, this issue was much simpler here than in Mortensen
because the undisputed factual record established several of the
traditional "badges of fraud" as to creditors existing when the trust was
created. 93
The court used § 544(b)(1), which permits a bankruptcy trustee
to enforce the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act ("UFTA") against
bankrupt debtors, as a fourth reason to invalidate the transfer. Given
the previous analysis of badges of fraud with regard to § 548, the court
had no difficulty identifying § 544(b) as yet another basis for
invalidating the trust.94
87. Id. at 807-08 (citing and applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 270
(1971)).
88. Id. at 808-09. The court does not state whether the trust instrument was executed in
Washington or Alaska. It would be shockingly lax if the parties did not bother to execute the
documents in Alaska, but presumably Huber would have emphasized the point if it was available
to him.
89. Id. at 809.
90. See supra text accompanying note 21.
91. In re Huber, 493 B.R. at 809-10.
92. Id. at 810-11. Lest the opinion seem unduly one-sided, the court declined to use "reverse
piercing" to invalidate the trust under the alter-ego doctrine. The court noted that the cases
applying that doctrine (all federal) had rested on a detailed analysis of the forum's doctrine.
Because Washington had no relevant authorities, the court found it a stretch to accept the trustee's
argument on that point. Id. at 810.
93. Id. at 812-14 (finding that Huber transferred assets in the face of litigation, transferred
substantially all of his assets, had significant indebtedness at the time of the transfer, and
effectively retained the transferred property).
94. Id. at 814-16.
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Finally, and most importantly, the court considered the
possibility that it might deny Huber a discharge under § 727, which
authorizes denial of a discharge upon proof that a debtor "transferred"
or "removed" property within one year before the petition was filed. 9
Here, although the trust had been created more than a year before the
petition, the trustee relied on Huber's use of assets from the trust to
support his living expenses during the year before filing. In the end, the
court held that the trustee was not entitled to a summary judgment
denying discharge because the trustee lacked direct evidence that
Huber acted for the "specific purpose" of defrauding his creditors. 96
Reasonable minds certainly can differ on how harshly to receive
the message of the Huber court. After all, Huber involved a debtor
almost paradigmatic in his efforts to avoid payment-the direct
opposite of Mortensen-and so the possibility remains that a debtor
more favorably situated than Huber might get a better reception.
Two problems, however, suggest such a sanguine interpretation
is dubious. First, the court's choice-of-law analysis, at least overtly, has
little or no relation to the facts of this case. Rather, on that point, the
decision stands for the unremarkable proposition that choice-of-law
analysis for onshore APTs will closely resemble the now-settled
analysis invalidating APTs in the offshore context.97
Second, there is, at least in the existing reporters,98 no reason to
think courts will be receptive to these trusts even on the best of facts.
Mortensen is evidence enough on that point, and the sentiments of that
decision are echoed in Zukerkorn. Because the § 548(e) analysis
articulated in Mortensen apparently would invalidate any APT, in state
or out of state, the road to successful protection must run, at a
minimum, over the barrier of the existing precedents.
V. LINGERING QUESTIONS: YOU GET WHAT YOU PAY FOR, OR MAYBE
EVEN LESS!
So where does that leave us? As far as the evidence suggests, the
process of state adoption is moving forward undiminished, while federal
courts assessing the legislation in litigation seem to be uniformly
hostile. It is less clear, however, that the advent of the onshore APTs
95. Section 727(a)(2).
96. In re Huber, 493 B.R. at 816-17.
97. See supra Section II.B.
98. The lapse of time suggests that there was no appeal in in re Mortensen; there is, as of
yet, no evidence of an appeal in in re Huber (or in re Zukerkorn).
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has had some cognizable effect on the market for APT use. Most
obviously, it has lowered the costs substantially. The facts of
Mortensen-particularly, the use of such a vehicle by a debtor far below
the midpoint of the income distribution-are illustrative. This reality
suggests, at least, something of a democratization of the death of
liability. On the other hand, the available empirical evidence suggests
that any flow of assets into (or out of) a jurisdiction based on the
existence of an APT statute is slight, at best.99
Still, there is little reason to hope that the onshore APT will be
any more effective at insulating assets from creditors than the offshore
APT. Given the long-standing results in Portnoy and the cases that
followed it, the inhospitable reception should come as no surprise. With
the cases to date providing some confirmation that judges are not (so
far) inclined to abandon the reasoning of the offshore trust cases, the
likelihood of enforcement remains bleak, whatever the fact pattern (as
summarized in Table 1).
Offshore Portnoy, tails choice or law
etc.
Onshore/In-State Mortensen Passes choice of law but fails
TalentUFTA
Onshore/Out-of- Huber Fails choice of law and TalentUFTA
State I II
The real question is what to make of the paucity of cases. We
could read the small number of cases as flowing from a consensus that
the plain ineffectiveness of the trusts makes it futile to litigate their
validity. On this reading, Mortensen is instructive because it suggests
that in a relatively small consumer bankruptcy with no substantial
debts owed other than to credit card issuers, the trustee nevertheless
readily found the resources to overcome the obstacles of the Alaska
APT.
On the other hand, we might read the small number of cases as
proof that the costs of litigation are so high (as compared to the
potential assets to be reached) as to make litigation fruitless. On this
99. Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds:
An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 410-12 (2005). By comparison,
it appears that abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities is related to an increase in a state's trust
assets of about 20% ($6 billion) and in average account size of about $200,000. Id. at 410.
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reading, the ability of strongly motivated debtors to combine the use of
an APT with other strategies 00 means that creditors will routinely find
themselves stymied by the costs of fighting through the entire matrix
of asset-protection strategies, whatever the ultimate legal penetrability
of any single strategy. 101
The discussion above suggests yet another example 102 of how
ineffective it is to "purchase" legislation for the benefit of a particular
interest. The analysis in this Article suggests that the onshore APT
statutes are providing little or no formal legal benefit to the settlors
that use them. They presumably provide considerable benefits to the
attorneys and investment professionals that recommend and
implement them. 103 But that seems a far cry from the "build it and they
100. The one most commonly mentioned to me by commenters is the Nevada limited liability
limited partnership (the LLLP); under Nevada law, the sole remedy of a creditor seeking to enforce
a judgment against that entity is to obtain a charging order from a Nevada court, a remedy which
is (apparently) not expeditious. E.g., Montana v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth), 484 B.R. 360, 368 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 2012). For a strong recommendation that practitioners combine the APT with a limited
liability partnership of some form, see Jonathan G. Blattmachr et al., Asset Planning on America's
Last Frontier: Alaska Trusts, Limited Partnerships, and LLCs, 23 ACTEC NOTES 240, 240 (1997).
See also Barry A Nelson, Asset Protection & Estate Planning: Why Not Have Both?, Presentation
at the 46th Annual Heckerling Inst. on Est. Plan., 47-61 (2012), available at
http://www.ficpa.org/Content/Files/Does/Ematerials/Materials 12AS NelsonCombinedSuppleme
ntalMaterials.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TZK4-JW6E (discussing tenancy by the entirety as
a method of asset protection).
101. I note that the Nevada LLLP, discussed supra note 100, does not promise the complete
protection from creditors that the APT promises, but rather simply complicates and extends the
process of collection.
102. See supra note 63 (discussing prior work making a similar point about BAPCPA).
103. One interesting aspect of the APT landscape is the strongly positive advice attorneys and
accountants offer their clients about the likely benefits of APTs. E.g., Kurt A Friesen, Domestic
Asset Protection Trusts: 15 Years After Alaska and Delaware, AB.A. TRUSTS & INVESTMENTS,
March-April 2012, at 6, 9 (emphasizing the "fact-specific" nature of in re Mortensen as a basis for
the conclusion that it does not "negate the utility" of APTs); Geoff N. Germane, Utah's New
Domestic Asset Protection Statute Makes State a Top Choice to Shield Assets, KIRTON McKONKIE
(April 2013), available at http://www.kmelaw.com/newsroom-alerts-Domestic-Asset-Protection-
Trust-DAPT.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SZX5-RAMQ (emphasizing the "numerous practical
uses" of the Utah statute, which "should earn [Utah] an invitation into the upper echelon of asset
protection trust jurisdictions," without mentioning the likelihood that most provisions of the
statute would not withstand judicial scrutiny); Williams Mullen, Client Alert: Gift and Creditor
Protection Planning with Virginia's New Self-Settled Spendthrift Trust Statute, WILLIAMS MULLEN
(May 21, 2012), available at http://www.williamsmullen.com/news/client-alert-gift-and-creditor-
protection-planning-virginiaE2 %80% 99s-new-self-settled-spendthrift-trust, archived at
http://perma.cc/4AJE-KDJY (acknowledging that Virginia's statute is not as favorable as those of
other jurisdictions but asserting, without mention of in re Mortensen or in re Huber, that the
statute "create[s] immense planning opportunities for clients and their families"); Steven J.
Oshins, The Hybrid Domestic Asset Protection Trust, AB.A. SEC. ON REAL PROP., TR., AND EST. L.
(RPTE eReport) (June 2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/publishing/rpte ereport/2013/3june/te articles.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/J6VC-53HY (emphasizing that "no non-bankruptcy creditor has challenged [an
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will come" expectations that an APT statute could turn a state into a
haven for incoming financial investment. 104
Recognizing that the question of formal legal enforceability is
important only to the extent it tracks any practical shift of outcomes, 105
one final topic to consider is whether there is any reason to expect the
judicial hostility to change: has the law already become so settled
against APTs that the future will leave them as a strategy effective only
as an ultimately unenforceable hurdle designed to heighten the costs of
collection? As mentioned in Section III, there is some reason to think
that the APT adoptions are both continuing and also coming in
progressively larger states. As summarized in Section IV.A, one of the
principal bases for the ineffectiveness of APT is the apparent perception
(displayed most plainly in Mortensen) that use of the statutes is
something outlandish, unusual, with no good justification. As the
statutes pass into the legislative enactments of more and more large
states, and thus come to govern the affairs of a larger share of the
nation's populace, surely there is some chance that judicial perspectives
on the statutes will shift as well. Still, given the ordinary mechanisms
of common-law development, the ever-growing body of negative case
law will make it harder and harder for the common law ever to shift
into a favorable pattern. It may be that only time will tell.
APT] all the way through the court system [successfully]"). For a rare critical assessment of the
situation, see Jay Adkisson, Why Dahl Doesn't Support the Viability of Domestic Asset Protection
Trusts, FORBES (July 10, 2013), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2013/07/10/
why-dahl-doesnt-support-the-viability-of-domestic-asset-protection-trusts/3/, archived at http/
12em /NX3 H ("A client would have to be dosing on mescaline to go for an asset protection
plan like that.").
104. See supra note 99 (documenting evidence that the trusts in fact are not associated with
any cognizable inflow of investments).
105. As suggested supra at notes 100-01 and accompanying text, the relation between the
formal unenforceability and practical enforceability of APT statutes is not yet clear.
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VI. APPENDIX
Rhode Island 1999 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 18-9.2-1 (2013)
Nevada 1999 NEV. REV. STAT. § 166.010 (LexisNexis
2013)
Oklahoma 2004 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 10 (West
2014)
Missouri 2004 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.5-501 (2013)
South Dakota 2005 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 55-16-1 (2014)
Tennessee 2007 TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-16-101 (2014)
Wyoming 2007 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-510 (2014)
New Hampshire 2009 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-D. 1 (2014)
Hawaii 2010 fHAw. REV. STAT. § 554G-1 (LexisNexis
2014)
Virginia 2012 VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-745.1 (2014)
Ohio 2013 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5816.14
(LexisNexis 2014)
Utah 2013 UTAH CODE ANN. §25-6-14 (2013)
Delaware 1997 DET, COnE ANN. tit 12. 8 3571 (2014)
